ONE OF THE FEW fortunate by-products of the American involvement in Viet Nam has been the growing attention lavished on the problems of Southeast Asia by Western scholars. Studies of Asian international politics flow steadily from the nation's presses, and it must be conceded that our knowledge of that area of the world grows apace.
Thus far, unfortunately, too many of these efforts have been marred by a stubborn utopianism and a general failure to separate fact from ideological or political predilection. It appears to be typically assumed, for example, that great power intervention in Asia is responsible for the existing state of affairs on that continent: the United States, it is alleged, inspired by a misguided definition of its national interest, has undertaken a variety of political and military initiatives, and these in turn have stimulated reciprocal-if often reluctantinvolvements by the communist powers. The road to peace for the region is thus assumed to be clear: the states of Southeast Asia should avoid entanglements with the major powers, and especially with the United States; ultimately, the area should be "neutralized" from cold war politics under international guarantees. The possibility that communist activity in Asia might be self-generating and constitute a serious threat to international order is too-infrequently considered.
Both of the volumes here reviewed, whatever their other merits, suffer in varying degree from defective analysis of this kind. Cambodia's Sihanouk, of course, has for some time been a folk-hero of sorts for advocates of neutralism as a solution to the crisis in Asia; Leifer's monograph is merely the latest in a series of attempts to make sense of the foreign policy of the mercurial autocrat. In the main, it is a thoughtful study, although adding little to previous knowledge. It is Leifer's contention-which few students of recent Cambodian foreign policy would challenge-that Sihanouk's diplomacy since his nation won independence from France has been dominated by a single concern, that of maintaining Cambodia's territorial integrity and security in the face of a variety of perceived threats from within and without. Surprisingly enough in view of more recent events, Si-hanouk's calculations immediately after the 1954 Geneva Conference were dominated by fear of the Viet Minh regime, whose expansionist designs he viewed as an ideological reincarnation of ancient Vietnamese imperialism. He therefore sought explicit security guarantees from the United States through a strong SEATO. In part due to Washington's rather unenthusiastic response to his overtures, however, and in part because of the growing appeal of Nehru's philosophy of "positive neutralism," Sihanouk began during 1955 to move toward a policy of nonalignment, in the process seeking closer relations with Communist China. The staunchly anticommunist governments oE Thailand and South Vietnam were at once afraid and outraged, and attempted through the application of diplomatic and economic pressures to force Sihanouk to return to a pro-Western stance. MOST ANALYSES of the recurrent eruption of urban violence tend to follow either of two simplistic formulas, viz:
1 ) The violence is engendered primarily by economic deprivation and social discrimination, and can be ended by removing these causes; or
2) The violence results from a failure of law enforcement due in large part to obstacles created by recent rulings of the courts; the remedy lies in sterner laws and in stricter enforcement by police and judiciary alike.
In either case the analyses appear to work toward preestablished conclusions derived from ideological prejudice or con-
